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Abstract 
There has been substantial interest in emotion after acquired brain injury (ABI), but less 
attention paid to emotion regulation (ER). Research has focused primarily on the ER strategy 
of reappraisal for regulating negative emotions, without distinguishing between classes of 
emotion, and there has been no attempt at exploring these differences in patients with ABI. 
The present study explored components of reappraisal, across classes of emotion, and their 
associated neuropsychological mechanisms. Thirty-five patients with ABI and twenty-two 
matched healthy control participants (HCs) completed two questionnaires, a battery of 
cognitive tasks, and an emotion regulation task (the Affective Story Recall Reappraisal task). 
Results suggest that those with ABI take longer, and generate fewer reappraisals than HCs 
across several discrete emotions. Notably, their ability to decrease emotional intensity did not 
differ significantly to HCs for negative emotions, but findings suggest that their reappraisals 
are less effective when up-regulating neutral emotions to positive. Working memory was the 
only significant predictor of the total number of reappraisals generated, and the time taken to 
produce a first reappraisal. Implications of these findings are discussed in the context of 
neuropsychological rehabilitation, including the role of the relatives in implementing and 
reinforcing micro-interventions.  
 
Keywords: emotion regulation, reappraisal, acquired brain injury, discrete emotions, 
cognitive control 
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Emotional changes have long been recognized as common impairments following 
acquired brain injury (ABI) (Draper & Ponsford, 2009; Diaz, Schwarzbold, Thais, Hohl, et 
al., 2012; Gainotti, 1993), and there has been substantial interest in emotion after ABI 
(Alway, McKay, Ponsford, & Schönberger, 2012; Shields, Ownsworth, O’Donovan, & 
Fleming, 2016; Williams & Evans, 2003). A number of studies that have investigated the 
effects of injury on, for example,  emotion perception (Bornhofen & McDonald, 2008), 
recognition (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun & Young, 2000) and experience (Calder et al., 
2000; de Sousa, McDonald, & Rushby, 2012). Indeed, this is in line with the emergence of a 
growing field of affective neuropsychology (McDonald, 2017). 
One aspect that has received less attention, but is particularly important to consider, is 
emotion regulation (ER) (Bechara, 2004; Beer & Lombardo, 2007). The most extensively 
used approach to ER is the “Process model”, which describes this ability as a range of 
strategies that influence emotions, their intensity and the way they are experienced and 
expressed (Gross, 2013, 2014, 2015; Gross & Muñoz, 1995). Impairment in ER is a common 
consequence of ABI, across various pathologies and brain regions (Bechara, 2004; Beer & 
Lombardo, 2007), and is a key transdiagnostic element of global distress and mood disorders 
in this population (Shields et al., 2016). 
The “Process model” of ER outlines five classes of strategy that are used to regulate 
emotions (Gross, 2014). One particular approach, reappraisal, is the most frequently 
investigated (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Troy, Shallcross, Brunner, Friedman, & 
Jones, 2018; Zilverstand, Parvaz, & Goldstein, 2017), and involves changing the meaning of 
a situation, to alter its emotional consequence (Gross, 2002; McRae, Ciesielki, & Gross, 
2012b). Reappraisal is well-understood to be an effective method for managing feelings 
(Sheppes & Meiran, 2007; Troy, Wihelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010). Its use is positively 
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correlated with well-being and greater psychological health in neurologically healthy 
individuals (Gross & John, 2003; McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012).  
Reappraisal and Cognitive Control  
Reappraisal is also known to be dependent on several cognitive control processes 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). This idea is consistent with neuroimaging studies, which have 
identified activation in areas in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) supporting cognitive control 
(Buhle, Silvers, Wager, Lopez, et al., 2014; Kalisch, 2009; McRae, Hughes, Chopra, 
Gabrieli, et al., 2010). Researchers have also tried to identify which neuropsychological 
functions support this complex process (McRae et al., 2012); for example, in the 
neurologically healthy, working memory may be a key capacity to keep the first appraisal in 
mind (Hendricks & Buchanan, 2015; McRae et al., 2012; Schmeichel, Volokhov, & 
Demaree, 2008). However, research into the neuropsychological mechanisms of reappraisal 
has produced variable evidence (Hendricks & Buchanan, 2016; McRae et al., 2012; Salas et 
al., 2014). In part because participants’ reappraisals cannot (because of movement artefacts) 
be verbally produced in an imaging setting (e.g. Buhle et al., 2014). Additionally, these 
studies are in neurologically normal participants who retain this ability.  
To address these critical gaps, Salas and colleagues (2014) investigated reappraisal 
generation in patients with brain injury, comprising reappraisal productivity (number of 
reappraisals generated), and difficulty (time to generate first reappraisal). This has been a 
fruitful approach because patients with ABI are often impaired in the manipulation of thought 
(Gomez Beldarrain, Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, Gonzalez, & Grafman, 2005; Luria, 1966), 
and therefore may struggle to generate positive re-interpretations (Salas et al., 2014). Brain-
injured patients may be especially vulnerable to reappraisal deficits in the presence of time 
limitations, related to inhibition and verbal ability performance, but not working memory 
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(Salas et al., 2014). Notably, this is a contrasting finding to the earlier literature in 
neurotypical participants, who are able to generate reappraisals (e.g. McRae et al., 2012). 
Discrete Emotions  
Research on ER, and its biological substrate, has focused primarily on reappraisal for 
negative emotions (e.g. Goldin et al., 2008), often not distinguishing between discrete 
negative emotions. Additionally, traditional reappraisal paradigms typically use visual stimuli 
(from the International Affective picture System, IAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) 
which may trigger diverse discrete emotions, but these emotional reactions are only assessed 
in terms of valence and intensity. This is noteworthy because different classes of emotion 
contain unique information about the interaction with the environment, and enable adaptive 
responding (Ekman, 1992; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Mauss, Levenson, Wilhelm, McCarter, & 
Gross, 2005). Equally important, these discrete emotions are supported by different neural 
systems (Celeghin, Diano, Bagnis, Viola, & Tamietto; 2017; Panksepp, 2003; 2004; 2005; 
2011, Vytal & Hamann, 2010), with a large neuroimaging literature supporting interacting 
brain regions associated with the experience, perception and recognition of various categories 
of emotion (Adolphs 2002; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012, for a 
meta-analysis).  
 The identification of multiple classes of emotion has provided an opportunity to 
understand how such experiences might vary. Some discrete emotions have been more 
closely associated with differences in decision-making (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), perception 
of risk (Lench & Levine, 2005), and behaviour (See Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011 for a 
meta-analysis). The majority of research on emotion regulation has yet to systematically 
compare strategies using a discrete emotion framework, instead viewing ER as a global 
ability across emotions (e.g. Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gross & John, 2003). There is, however, 
a modest body of work describing how ER, and specifically reappraisal, varies across 
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positive and negative emotions (Kim & Hamann, 2007; Mak, Hu, Zhang, Xiao, & Lee, 2009; 
Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008), suggesting that neurologically healthy individuals find it easier to 
up-regulate positive emotions through reappraisal, than down-regulating negative emotions 
(Kim & Hamann, 2007). Some of the most convincing evidence of the relevance of discrete 
emotions in ER comes from the finding that strategies employed to regulate anger and 
sadness differ in both their use and effectiveness (Rivers, Brackett, Katulak, & Salovey, 
2007). Individuals are more likely to use reappraisal for sadness than anger, and more likely 
to use situation-based strategies for anger compared to sadness (Rivers et al., 2007). It is, 
however, less clear how people with brain injury use ER strategies across different emotions.  
Discrete Emotions in ABI Research 
In ABI, there is a large body of research exploring various aspects of emotional 
difficulties (e.g. Shields et al., 2016; Williams & Evans, 2003). This includes a prominent 
theory that the right hemisphere mediates and processes negative emotions, and the left 
hemisphere positive emotions (the valence hypothesis) (Davidson, 2001; Demaree, Everhart, 
Youngstrom, & Harrison, 2005). Though studies on the valence hypothesis have provided 
mixed support (Demaree et al., 2005, for a review), there is substantial evidence of right 
hemisphere dominance for emotional processing regardless of valence (the right hemisphere 
hypothesis) (Gainotti, 2005, 2012, for reviews).  
Additionally, there are a number of investigations of difficulties with discrete 
negative emotions, in particular anger (Mcdonald, Hunt, Henry, Dimoska, & Bornhofen, 
2010; Neumann, Malec, & Hammond, 2015), depression (Kreutzer, Seel, & Gourley, 2001), 
and a range of emotional disorders (Shields et al., 2016). There are also studies which 
systematically address emotional processes across various emotion categories, for example 
the study of emotion recognition across classes of emotions after TBI (Babbage, Zupan, 
Neumann, Tomita, & Willer, 2011; Croker & McDonald, 2005), the re-experience of discrete 
Reappraisal and discrete emotions in ABI 
 
 7 
emotions in Korsakoff patients (Stanciu, Rafal, & Turnbull, 2018), and emotional experience 
in patients with ABI (Salas, Radovic, Castro, & Turnbull, 2015).  
The present study 
To our knowledge, there has been no attempt at exploring differences in emotion 
regulation (based upon the “Process model”) across different classes of emotions, in patients 
with ABI and healthy controls (HC). This provides an opportunity to understand how a well-
researched ER strategy, reappraisal, might differ across emotions following injury. Building 
on previous research, the present study employed an internal mood induction paradigm 
(Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 2012: Salas et al., 2015) adapted to measure reappraisal. 
Notably, personally-salient emotion elicitation tasks, such as the Affective Story Recall task 
(ASR) (Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005), may be more effective at inducing specific discrete 
emotions, at greater intensities, compared to external emotion elicitation (Salas et al., 2012, 
2015).  
The present study is the first to investigate reappraisal in ABI patients using an 
autobiographical recall reappraisal task (c.f. Salas et al., 2015, which focused on emotion 
elicitation). In addition to reappraisal ability, the present study also examined reappraisal 
generation, by measuring productivity (total number of reappraisals generated) and difficulty 
(time taken to reappraise), as based on previous reappraisal research in this patient sample 
(Salas et al., 2014). 
Given that patients with ABI experience difficulties across a range of discrete 
emotions, the following hypotheses are explored. Firstly, a “discrete emotion hypothesis”: 
that patients with ABI will take longer to generate reappraisals (reappraisal difficulty), will 
produce fewer reappraisals (reappraisal productivity), and have less effective reappraisals 
(reappraisal ability) compared to the HC group, differentially across classes of emotions. In 
addition, a “cognitive control hypothesis”: cognitive control abilities (working memory, 
Reappraisal and discrete emotions in ABI 
 
 8 
inhibition, and verbal ability) will be positively related to reappraisal productivity and ability, 
and negatively related to reappraisal difficulty.  
Methods 
Participants  
 A total of 57 participants were included in the study, comprising an ABI group, and 
an age and education matched HC group.  
Acquired Brain Injury Group 
Thirty-five participants with acquired brain injury (ABI) were prospectively referred 
mainly by clinicians at the North Wales Brain Injury Service (NWBIS), Betsi Cadwaladr 
University Health Board (BCUHB), a community-based outpatient rehabilitation service (n = 
25). A small proportion were recruited from a social rehabilitation day service in Manchester 
(The Headforward Centre) (n = 5), and through North Wales branches of the brain injury 
charity, Headway (n = 5). Eligible participants were adults with a confirmed ABI, as per 
NWBIS referral criteria (Coetzer, Vaughan, Roberts, & Rafal, 2003), duration of 9 months or 
greater since injury, and sufficient cognitive and language ability to complete the tasks (as 
judged by clinicians and staff members). Exclusion criteria included the presence of a 
psychiatric or substance use disorder in need of acute care, a neurodegenerative condition, or 
learning disability. Participants were also excluded if they did not have the capacity to give 
informed consent.  
The average age of participants was 51 (SD = 11.82, range 26 - 74), with an average 
of 13 years in education (SD = 2.24, range 10 - 18). There were 27 males and 7 females, with 
an average time since injury of 8.7 years (SD = 9.86, range 9 months - 32 years). Details of 
injury characteristics can be found in Table 1.   
Healthy Control Group 
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 Twenty-two, age and education matched, neurotypical healthy control participants 
were recruited from the North Wales community.  The average age of participants was 54 
(SD = 8.46, range 35 - 69), with an average of 12.5 years in education (SD = 1.79, range 10 - 
16). There were 12 males and 10 females.  
[Table 1 here] 
Measures  
Emotional assessment 
 In order to evaluate emotional symptomology and functioning, two self-report 
questionnaires were employed. Firstly, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was administered. This consists of anxiety and depression 
subscales, with 14 items such as ‘I feel tense or wound up’. The participant indicates, on a 4 
point scale, agreement with each statement. This is a reliable and valid measure of anxiety 
and depression (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), and its use has been validated in individuals with 
brain injury (Schönberger & Ponsford, 2010). Secondly, the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire, adapted for children and adolescents (ERQ-CA) (Gullone & Taffe, 2012), to 
assess self-report reappraisal in daily life. The adapted version was used because feedback 
from previous work in our lab (Salas et al., 2014) using the original ERQ (Gross & John, 
2003), suggested that several patients struggled to grasp the wording. The ERQ-CA reports 
sound internal consistency (Gullone & Taffe, 2012). 
Cognitive control assessment 
A short battery of cognitive control tasks was used to measure working memory, verbal 
fluency, and inhibition.  
a) Working Memory was measured using the Digit Span (forward, backwards, and 
sequence) sub-task from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS IV) (Wechsler, 
2008). These tasks are informative measures of working memory in brain-injured 
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participants, and have been used as a marker for cognitive deficits (e.g. Millis, 
Rosenthal, Novack, Sherer, et al., 2001).  
b) Verbal Ability was assessed using the Letter Fluency sub-task from the Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function system (D-KEFS) (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Letter 
fluency has been shown to be more strongly associated to cognitive control than other 
measures (Henry & Crawford, 2004), and has been used previously to investigate 
cognitive control and reappraisal in patients with ABI (Salas et al., 2014).  
c) Inhibition was evaluated using the Hayling sentence completion task from the 
Hayling and Brixton tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). This task was chosen due to its 
sensitivity (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), and validity in a sample of brain-injured 
patients (Odhuba, van den Broek, & Johns, 2005).  
Affective Story Recall Reappraisal (ASRR) task 
This task has been adapted from previous reappraisal generation tasks that have used 
stimuli form the IAPS (Salas, Gross, Rafal, Viñas-Guasch, & turnbull, 2013; Salas et al., 
2014), and the ASR emotion elicitation task, described in detail elsewhere (Salas et al., 2012; 
Turnbull et al., 2005). Recalled personal events, as opposed to traditional IAPS stimuli, may 
elicit discrete target emotions at higher intensities (Chirico, Cipresso, & Gaggioli, 2018) and 
follow an emerging trend in emotion research of focusing on naturalistic contexts (Siedlecka 
& Denson, 2018).  
The task (See Appendix A for details) was carried out on a 13” laptop screen, 
providing step-by-step instructions, to avoid any memory bias. Following 2 practice trials, the 
participant was shown an emotion word (either ‘sad’, ‘scared’, ‘angry’, or ‘neutral’), and 
described an event which caused them to feel that emotion. Following this they indicated how 
intense they felt the emotion on a 0 to 10 scale, before generating reappraisals, and associated 
intensity measurement. 
Reappraisal and discrete emotions in ABI 
 
 11 
The 3 negative emotions (sadness, fear, and anger) were chosen because of 
widespread agreement in the literature that these are basic emotions (Tracy & Randles, 2011, 
for a review). The ‘neutral’ condition involved neutral recollections, to be reappraised into 
positive emotions; chosen to map on to reappraisal in real life settings (e.g. Livingstone & 
Srivastava, 2012).1 Each emotion word appeared twice, resulting in 8 total trials. The task 
was recorded and transcribed verbatim, the total number of reappraisals were counted, and 
the time to generate a first reappraisal noted.   
See Figure 1 for visual representation of one trial (“sad” condition).   
[Figure 1 here] 
Procedure 
Ethical approval was granted by Bangor University (2017-16048) and BCUHB 
(224613). For the ABI group, potential participants were identified prospectively by members 
of the clinical team at the NWBIS, rehabilitation staff at the Headforward Centre, and the 
Chairs of Headway branches. One referred participant was not included, due to later concerns 
of a neurodegenerative condition. Healthy control participants (HC) recruited form the 
community were invited to take part. Following written informed consent, 
neuropsychological and emotional tasks were carried out within one session in a quiet room: 
at Bangor University, NWBIS, Headforward Centre, or participants’ own homes. 
Questionnaires, neuropsychological tasks, and the ASRR task were administered in random 
order, with a short-break approximately half-way through the session. The ASRR task was 
transcribed and reappraisals were counted. If needed, a reappraisal coding guide was used in 
support (McRae et al., 2012b). All measures were administered by the first author, or trained 
research assistants. 
                                                 
1 The alternative, making positive emotions more positive, would effectively be promoting unrealistic optimism 
(Fleming & Strong, 1995). It would also be difficult to measure any differences in emotional intensity because 
of ceiling effects. 
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Data Analysis  
 Three measures of reappraisal were produced by the ASRR task, resulting in three 
variables. Reappraisal difficulty was obtained by averaging the time it takes to produce a first 
reappraisal. Reappraisal productivity was calculated by adding the total number of 
reappraisals produced, and reappraisal ability was calculated by averaging the difference 
value between self-report emotional intensity before, and after, reappraising.  
 Data was analysed using ‘R’ Software, with additional packages (‘Stats’, 
‘Complmrob’, and ‘robustbase’). As the data was not normally distributed the discrete 
emotion hypothesis was analysed with several Mann-Whitney U tests, with Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons (new alpha level .013), comparing 1) reappraisal 
difficulty, 2) reappraisal productivity, and 3) reappraisal ability, between patients with ABI 
and the HC group across the neutral, sadness, fear, and anger conditions.  
The cognitive control hypothesis was explored by carrying out three separate robust 
multiple linear regression analyses using the ‘lmrob’ function (‘robustbase’ package) with 
bootsrapped coefficients using fast and robust bootsrap via the ‘bootscoef’ function 
(‘complmrob’ package) with ‘MM’ method (Salibián-Barrera, Aelst, & Willems, 2008). 
Inhibition (Hayling sentences task scores), working memory (Digit Span WMS IV scores), 
and verbal ability (Letter fluency DKEFS scores) were entered as predictors, with the 
outcome variable consisting of reappraisal difficulty, productivity, and ability across all 
emotion trials combined (ASRR Total). Bootstrapping techniques were employed for 999 
bootstrap samples as a form of model validation (Babyak, 2004; Efron, 2003).  
Results  
Emotional and Cognitive functioning 
Participants’ average scores on measures of emotional and cognitive functioning can 
be seen in Table 2. In relation to depression symptomology, participants with ABI scored on 
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average within the “borderline abnormal” range on the HADS, and were significantly more 
depressed than the HC group, with 11/35 scoring within the clinical range. On the anxiety 
subscale, participants with ABI also scored on average within the “borderline abnormal” 
range and were significantly more anxious than the HC group, with 20/35 in the clinical 
range. Participants with ABI also reported using reappraisal significantly less frequently to 
regulate their emotions than the HC group on the ERQ-CA.  
On average both ABI and HC group scored within the “moderate average” range on 
the Hayling sentence task, as an indicator of inhibition. Working memory scores (Digit span, 
WAIS IV) and verbal ability scores (Letter fluency, DKEFS) for the ABI group were in the 
“low average” range, and were significantly less than the HC group.  
[Table 2 here] 
The Discrete Emotion Hypothesis 
 This sought to investigate reappraisal difficulty, productivity, and ability across 4 
classes of emotion.  
Reappraisal Difficulty  
 The average time taken to produce a first reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) was 
compared between the ABI and HC group, across the emotion classes (neutral, sadness, fear, 
and anger). See Table 3 for descriptive statistics. 
 [Table 3 here] 
  Results of the Mann-Whitney U test demonstrates that the ABI group took 
significantly more time to produce a reappraisal compared to the HC group for the neutral (U 
= 150.00, z = -3.86, p < .001, r = .51), sadness (U = 193.50, z = -3.14, p = .001, r = .42), and 
fear conditions (U = 145.50, z = -3.94, p < .001, r = .52), all demonstrating medium-to-large 
effect sizes. There was no significant difference between groups for the anger condition, 
although there was a trend (U = 275.50, z = -1.80, p = .072, r = .24). See Figure 2.  
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 [Figure 2 here] 
Reappraisal Productivity 
 The total number of reappraisals produced (reappraisal productivity) was compared 
between the ABI and HC group, across the emotion classes. See Table 4 for descriptive 
statistics.  
 [Table 4 here] 
Results of the Mann-Whitney U test demonstrated that the ABI group produced 
significantly fewer reappraisals compared to the HC group for the neutral (U = 222.50, z = -
2.753, p = .005, r = .36), sadness (U = 232.00, z = -2.55, p = .010, r = .34), and fear 
conditions (U = 210.00, z = -2.92, p = .003, r = .39), all demonstrating medium effect sizes. 
The difference between groups for the anger condition was marginally significant (with the 
adjusted alpha level), and demonstrated a medium effect size (U = 243.50, z = -2.26, p = 
.018, r = .31). See Figure 3. 
 [Figure 3 here] 
Reappraisal Ability  
This analysis was conducted to investigate differences is reappraisal ability between 
the ABI and HC group across classes of emotion. Participants’ reappraisal ability scores 
(difference between initial self-report arousal and arousal after reappraising) were compared 
across emotions: neutral, sadness, fear, and anger. For descriptive statistics see Table 5.  
[Table 5 here] 
The results of the Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the ABI group had significantly 
lower reappraisal ability scores, compared to the HC group, on the neutral condition with a 
medium effect size (U = 188.00, z = -3.265, p = .001, r = .43). There were no significant 
differences in reappraisal ability across the sadness (U = 284.50, z = -1.65, p = .099, r = .22), 
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fear (U = 311.50, z = -1.21, p = .230, r = .16), and anger conditions (U = 266.500, z = -1.938, 
p = .053, r = .26). See Figure 4. 2 
[Figure 4 here] 
The Cognitive Control Hypothesis 
  This sought to investigate a range of cognitive elements related to the components of 
reappraisal. A series of robust multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to 
investigate the relationship between three measures of cognitive control (working memory, 
verbal ability, and inhibition) and reappraisal components (difficulty, productivity, and 
ability) across all emotion trials combined (ASRR Total). For this the ABI group and HC 
group were combined to increase sample size.   
Reappraisal difficulty. The model explained 25% of the variance, and significantly 
improved prediction of reappraisal difficulty (R2 = .25, F(3,53) = 17.40, p < .001). According 
to bootstrap for coefficients, the only significant predictor was working memory (Digits 
WAIS scores) (β = -.22, p = .006), suggesting that a unit increase in working memory ability 
would result in a decrease of 0.22 seconds in the time taken to generate a first reappraisal. 
Reappraisal productivity. The model containing all predictor variables (working 
memory, verbal fluency, and inhibition) explained 21% of the variance, and significantly 
improved prediction of reappraisal productivity (R2 = .21, F(3,53) = 18.41, p < .001). 
Bootstrap for coefficients, demonstrated that the only significant predictor in the model was 
working memory (Digits WAIS scores), β = .54, p = .001. The coefficients demonstrate that a 
unit increase in working memory would result in an 0.54 increase in the number of 
reappraisals produced. 
                                                 
2 Given the distributed nature of lesion site and underlying pathology of the sample, Mann Whitney U tests were 
carried out to compare reappraisal difficulty, productivity, and ability across all emotions; between those with 
TBI (n = 20) vs CVA (n = 13), and those with frontal brain injury (n = 13) vs non-frontal injury (n = 6). There 
were no significant differences or obvious trends. A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to compare the components of 
reappraisal across emotions between those with left lateralised (n = 7), right lateralised (n = 7), and bilateral 
lesions (n = 9). Again, there were no significant differences or obvious trends. 
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Reappraisal ability. The model explained only 2% of the variance in reappraisal 
ability, and did not significantly improve predictions (R2 = .02, F(3,53) = 1.37, p = .712). 
There were no significant predictors within the model.3  
Summary of results  
These findings suggest that, compared to HC participants, patients with ABI take 
longer to generate a reappraisal, and generate fewer reappraisals across all emotion 
conditions. Concerning reappraisal ability, this might vary as a function of the emotion type, 
with the results suggesting that participants with ABI are comparatively less effective at up-
regulating neutral to positive emotion, compared to the down-regulation of sadness, fear, and 
anger. In regards cognitive control hypothesis, the findings suggested that working memory 
has a role in two subprocesses of reappraisal only: predicting the time taken to produce a 
reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty), and the total number of reappraisals produced (reappraisal 
productivity). There were, however, no predictors of reappraisal ability, suggesting that 
cognitive control may not play a role in regulating emotional experience through reappraisal.  
Discussion 
There has been no previous attempt to systematically compare components of 
reappraisal, using a discrete emotion framework, in an ABI sample. This is an important 
question, in particular in the context of brain-injured patients, where it might inform 
rehabilitation clinicians. Additionally, the research into the underlying neuropsychological 
components has not been especially clear (Hendricks & Buchanan, 2016; McRae et al., 
2012). The present study aimed to address these gaps, by investigating whether components 
of reappraisal (difficulty, productivity, and ability) varied as a function of the emotion in 
                                                 
3 Due to the differences in reappraisal ability between the negative emotions and the neutral emotion, reported in 
the discrete emotion hypothesis, a total score of negative emotions only (excluding neutral) was calculated and 
the regression run again. The results remained similar, with low explanation of variance (6%) and no significant 
predictors in the model. 
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patients with ABI relative to a HC group. A second aim was to investigate the cognitive 
control capacities related to these three components of reappraisal. 
Reappraisal generation across discrete emotions  
A key finding of the present study was that patients with brain injury took 
significantly longer to generate a reappraisal (compared to HC participants) for the sadness, 
fear, and the neutral to positive conditions. They also took longer for the anger condition, 
though this did not reach significance (perhaps an artefact of the small sample size). This 
provides further support for Salas and colleagues (2014), who found that patients with ABI 
may be vulnerable to reappraisal generation impairment in the presence of time limitations. 
Additionally, the present study extends this idea by suggesting that a brain injury 
compromises the capacity to positively re-interpret events quickly across several discrete 
emotion categories. In other words, it seems that this impairment is a global difficulty, and 
not related to any specific emotions. 
 The results also demonstrate that those with ABI generated significantly fewer 
reappraisals relative to the HC group, across the sadness, fear and the neutral-to-positive 
conditions, and approached significance for the anger condition. This is a contrasting finding 
to the only previous group study of reappraisal generation in an ABI sample, which 
demonstrated that participants with brain injury were able to generate a similar number of 
reappraisals to HCs (Salas et al., 2014). This variation may be a result of tasks used 
(traditional IAPS paradigm versus a task based on personally salient emotional memories).  
This is consistent with the idea that reappraisal impairment may be exaggerated in situations 
that are closer to real life (Salas et al., 2014). 
 Considered together, it seems that those with an ABI are less able to generate 
reappraisals, across several emotions. If reappraisal is a two-stage process (initial meanings 
are inhibited, and new meanings generated) (Salas et al., 2014), the findings suggest that the 
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presence of a brain injury particularly impacts upon this first stage. A possible explanation is 
that this particular ER strategy relies on the core ability to think flexibly, in order to generate 
new interpretations of events (Ochsner & Gross, 2004), something that is known to be 
affected in this patient group (Gomez Beldarrain, et al., 2005).  Reappraisal is complex, and 
dependent upon cognitive control processes (McRae et al., 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005), 
therefore it is not surprising that patients with ABI who are executively impaired find it more 
difficult to generate reappraisals. This idea is consistent with a recent line of evidence in 
older adults, which suggests that reappraisal may not be the ER strategy of choice for those 
with age-related cognitive decline (Scheibe, Sheppes, & Staudinger, 2015).  
Reappraisal ability across negative emotions 
To our knowledge the present study is the first to investigate reappraisal ability, 
defined as the reappraisals’ success at reducing (or amplifying) emotional intensity in line 
with the reappraisals’ goals, in a group of patients with brain injury. There were no 
significant differences in reappraisal ability between HCs and patients with ABI when 
regulating sadness, fear, or anger, although slightly lower for the ABI group. Overall, this 
suggests that once they are able to generate reappraisals, patients with brain injury are 
equally able to reduce the intensity of negative emotions through using this ER strategy. This 
has important implications for neurorehabilitation (See more below). 
The present study suggests that all negative emotions are reappraised similarly for 
both the ABI and HC group, comparable to that reported elsewhere in the discrete emotion 
literature in neurologically healthy adults (Mikolajczak, Nelis, Hansenne, & Quoidbach, 
2008). The study also extends previous findings in work with children, which demonstrated 
that reappraisal is an effective strategy for regulating both fear and sadness (Davis, Quiñones-
Camacho, & Buss, 2016). It is also similar to the results of a study using a similar 
autobiographical recall task, again in a neurologically healthy sample (Rivers, Brackett, 
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Katulak, & Salovey, 2007). These findings suggest that reappraisal is an approach applied 
commonly to all negative emotions, for both HCs and individuals with brain injury, rather 
than suggesting that specific emotions have individual regulatory mechanisms. 
The lack of significant difference between the ABI and HC group, however, is 
surprising, considering the numerous reports of specific emotional difficulties experienced by 
those with ABI (e.g. Fleminger, Oliver, Williams, & Evans, 2003; Gainotti 1993; Shields et 
al., 2016).  For example, the commonly reported mood disorders such as depression 
(Bombardier, Fann, Temkin, Esselman, et al., 2010) and anxiety (Mallya, Sutherland, 
Pongracic, Mainland, & Ornstein, 2015), and difficulties with anger and aggression (Baguley, 
Cooper, & Felmingham, 2006). There are a number of possibilities for this finding. Firstly, it 
is likely that emotional distress is a result of emotion dysregulation, which includes several 
strategies (Shields et al., 2016), whereas the present study focused exclusively on reappraisal. 
Additionally, during the task participants were instructed to reappraise, it does not follow that 
patients would spontaneously reappraise in real life.   
Reappraisal ability for positive emotion 
An unexpected finding was that of significantly lower reappraisal ability scores when 
up-regulating to positive emotion, suggesting that brain-injured patients find reappraisal 
comparatively less effective when attempting to increase neutral states. This is in line with 
the idea that the consequences and success of ER strategies are not always consistent across 
negative and positive emotions (Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Nezlek & 
Kuppens, 2008). This finding is especially interesting in the context of previous findings in 
non-brain-injured individuals, who find it easier to use reappraisal to regulate positive 
emotions, compared to negative emotions (Kim & Hamann, 2007; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; 
Ochsner, Ray, Cooper, Robertson, et al., 2004). It has been suggested that this may be 
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because amplifying an emotional reaction is less difficult than decreasing it (Ochsner et al., 
2004).  
Notably, the opposite was found in the present study. There are a number of 
possibilities for this. Firstly, it may be related to how the conditions within the task differ. 
That is, for the down-regulation of negative emotions, participants first described a personal 
story which elicited a negative emotion. In contrast, the up-regulation of neutral to positive 
was framed as a neutral baseline, and therefore may require a different skill-set in which the 
ABI group were more impaired. This is in line with the idea that emotional intensity can 
affect ER strategy choice (Scheibe et al., 2015; Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 2011; 
Sheppes & Gross, 2011). 
A second possible explanation relates to reappraisal ability in those with low mood, 
who show decreased ability to sustain positive emotions when using reappraisal (Heller, 
Johnstone, Shackman, Light, et al., 2009). If the experience of positive emotion increases 
reappraisal use (Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Fredrickson, 2001), then those who experience 
less positive affect may struggle to use reappraisal to up-regulate positive emotion. As there 
are high rates of depression among the ABI group, they may be subject to the same effects. 
However, re-investigation of our sample does not suggest that patients with lower mood are 
especially poor in up-regulation, as there was no correlation between their depression scores 
and reappraisal ability for the neutral condition (Spearman’s rho = .06, p = .736). Future 
research would benefit from further investigating the effect of low mood in ABI on the up-
regulation of positive emotion. 
These findings suggest that reappraisal modulates all negative emotions to a similar 
level (likely due to shared neural mechanisms) regardless of the specific negative emotion. 
However, for individuals with brain injury, reappraisal seems comparatively less effective 
when up-regulating neutral to positive emotion.  
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Cognitive bases of reappraisal 
 In relation to the cognitive control hypothesis, the main finding was that working 
memory was the only significant predictor of both the average time taken to produce a 
reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty), and the total number of reappraisals produced (reappraisal 
productivity). This result provides additional support to previous findings in neurologically 
healthy participants that working memory is an important function for reappraisal (Hendricks 
& Buchanan, 2015; Jasielska, Kaczmarek, Bronska, Dominiak et al., 2017; McRae et al., 
2012; Schmeichel et al., 2008). Additionally, these findings extend a well-established 
association between working memory and both reappraisal ability (e.g. McRae et al., 2012), 
and frequency (e.g. Jasielska et al., 2017). Reappraisal is a complex cognitive process, that 
may well include several elements (McRae et al., 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). The present 
study especially supports the role of working memory in maintaining the goal of 
reappraising, and shielding it from the initial meaning that may otherwise remain in the 
forefront of attention (Kanske, Heisser, Schönfelder, Bongers & Wessa, 2010; Gross, 2013).  
 A third finding of note was that none of the measures of cognitive control predicted 
reappraisal ability, the effectiveness of the reappraisal at modifying emotional intensity. This 
is surprising, because the majority of the literature has focused on this global ability, and the 
lack of significance might be argued to contradict the large body of neuroimaging studies 
demonstrating activation in brain areas associated with cognitive control (Buhle et al., 2014, 
for a review). However, these neuroimaging studies were in neurologically healthy 
individuals, who are able to reappraise effectively.  
It is also possible that the lack of a significant predictor of effectiveness might be 
related to other components of cognitive control, not measured in the present study. For 
example, although somewhat unexplored, abstract reasoning may also be related to 
reappraisal (McRae et al., 2012; Salas et al., 2013). This is likely because reappraisal requires 
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one to inhibit immediate emotional responses, in order to employ abstract ideas to change the 
meaning of a situation and its emotional impact (Salas et al., 2013).  
Models of Reappraisal 
How might these findings relate to existing models of reappraisal (e.g. Kalisch, 2009; 
Salas et al., 2014)? The present study appears to lend further support to a two-stage process, 
usually argued to consist of early and late components. The early stages are typically argued 
to involve choosing and implementing a reappraisal strategy, whereas the late components 
are concerned with maintaining the strategy in working memory (Kalisch, 2009). Developing 
this model further, Salas and colleagues (2014) suggested that inhibition and verbal fluency 
might be important for the early stages, inhibiting the initial meaning and generating a new 
appraisal, but they found no evidence for the role of working memory in this early phase. The 
present findings suggest that working memory appears to have a role in distancing from the 
negative initial appraisal, and producing a contesting mental representation of a positive 
nature. However, there may be an additional capacity required during the late phase, for 
example, to translate the reappraisal into a change in emotional intensity. It may also suggest 
that when it comes to regulating emotional experience of a mental representation, it is not so 
important whether cognitive control skills are average or limited, as long as one is able to 
generate a reappraisal.  
Implications for neuropsychological rehabilitation 
 The present study contributes to our understanding of how brain injury may impact 
upon reappraisal, across various emotion classes. In particular, by demonstrating that patients 
with ABI are less able to generate reappraisals, and may find reappraisal less effective when 
up-regulating positive emotions. This is consistent with the idea that a brain injury increases 
one’s vulnerability to emotion dysregulation (Salas et al., 2013; 2014), and perhaps especially 
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for generating reappraisals, the experience of sustaining positive emotions, and avoiding 
instabilities (the ‘mood swings’ commonly reported by families).  
 The finding that patients find it difficult to generate reappraisals is particularly 
relevant for neuropsychological rehabilitation because this skill can be supported and 
facilitated externally, such as by family members. It has been shown that providing prompts 
can assist with the process of disengaging from the initial appraisal, and that can improve the 
capacity to generate alternative interpretations of events (Salas et al., 2013). It may also 
provide suggestions for treatment, through the development of programmes which include an 
element of reappraisal generation training.   
Another core difficulty may be regulating the experience of positive emotions. One 
way to help promote and acknowledge positive affect is by looking to the field of Positive 
Psychology (PP) (Seligman, 2000; Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005; See Donaldson, 
Dollwet, & Rao, 2015 for a review), broadly, study of positive emotion and traits, well-being, 
and optimal functioning, and has developed a number of small, simple PP interventions 
(Seligman et al., 2005). Recently, there has been growing interest and appreciation of such 
interventions in rehabilitation (Bertisch, Rath, Long, Ashman, & Rashid, 2014; Cullen, 
Pownall, Cummings, Baylan, et al., 2018; Evans, 2011; Karagiorgou, Evans, & Cullen, 2017; 
Rabinowitz & Arnett, 2018). One particularly influential approach is the “Three Good 
Things” diary, where one writes down three things that go well each day, for a week, with a 
short explanation about causality and each event (Seligman et al., 2005). PP has many light 
touch interventions, for example using signature strengths in a new way, savouring, and 
letters of gratitude (Boiler, Haverman, Westerhof, Riper, et al., 2013; Evans, 2011; Seligman 
et al., 2005).  
 An important point to address, however, is that many patients with ABI have 
executive impairment, and may find it difficult to implement such activities (Burgess, 
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Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998; Stuss, 2011; Stuss & Alexander, 2007). This 
highlights the role of external regulation of emotion, which can be very effective (Salas 
2012b; Salas et al., 2013). For instance, the use of scaffolding or external dialogue from a 
relative has been shown to compensate for cognitive impairment (Salas et al., 2013). One 
promising approach would be to reach relatives and care-givers to embed these ideas, so they 
can be consistently reinforced, and optimize generalisation of therapeutic gains. It might be 
that micro-interventions by families, such as scaffolding, and supporting patients to reflect on 
Three Good Things, could help patients acknowledge their positive emotions and stabilise the 
“mood swings”.  
Future directions 
Calculating reappraisal ability in the ASRR task relied on self-report scores of 
emotional intensity. Though previous work has demonstrated that self-report measures during 
reappraisal correlate with changes in neural activation and physiology (Ochsner, Bunge, 
Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010), some have reported 
dissociations between these measures (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Nonetheless, the subjective 
emotional experience is, in itself, an important component of ER processes. Future work may 
benefit from complementing the ASRR task with a measure peripheral physiology.   
A further promising approach is the nature of the ASRR task itself, which has strong 
ecological validity. This follows an emerging trend in the study of emotion, where processes 
are observed or elicited in more naturalistic methods (Lench et al., 2011; Rovenpor, 
Skogsberg, & Isaacowitz, 2013; Salas et al., 2012; 2015). As previously noted, personal 
events may be particularly effective at inducing higher levels of emotional arousal (Salas et 
al., 2012; 2015), and are closer to real-life situations, where reappraisal is an important part 
of daily life (Brockman, Ciarrochi, Parker, & Kashdan, 2017; McRae et al., 2012). The 
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ASRR allows for the investigation of reappraisal for various target emotions in a more 
naturalistic setting. 
Much of the ER literature has investigated reappraisal, but there is growing interest in 
other regulatory processes: for example, situation selection (Markovitch, Netzer, & Tamir, 
2017; Sands & Isaacowitz, 2017; Webb, Lindquist, Jones, Avishai, & Sheeran, 2018) and 
attentional deployment (Demeyer, Sanchez, & De Raedt, 2017; Ferri & Hajcak, 2015; Wirth 
& Kunzmann, 2018). Future work in people with neurological damage would benefit from 
better investigating these approaches, given that these strategies may be particularly 
important for those low in cognitive control, such as the elderly (Wirth & Kunzmann, 2018) 
and people with mood disorders (Webb et al., 2018).  
Conclusion 
Emotional changes after brain injury have been the focus of a growing literature 
(Fleminger et al., 2003; Shields et al., 2016; Williams & Evans, 2003). Indeed, with a greater 
understanding of the relevance of emotion in rehabilitation (Mateer, Sira, & O’connell, 
2005), we have seen a recent shift towards an approach which focuses upon socio-emotional 
adjustment (Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer, 2010). Nonetheless, research on the effects of ABI on 
emotion regulation (based upon the ‘process model’) has been relatively modest (Salas et al., 
2013; 2014). The present study not only demonstrates that an ABI can compromise the 
capacity to generate reappraisals, and in particular to do this rapidly, but this is the first study 
to demonstrate that brain-injured patients find reappraisal especially difficult for up-
regulating positive emotions. Consistent with previous research, the study also provides 
evidence in support of the role of working memory in reappraisal, which suggests a range of 
interventions which may be useful for clinicians and patients’ families. 
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Appendix 1 -  Affective Story Recall Reappraisal Task Instructions 
 
Introduction. The task was introduced as follows “Sometimes people try to make 
themselves feel better by looking on the bright side of things. You will see an emotion word 
on the screen, it will be either sad, scared, angry, or neutral. When you see each word, try to 
recall an event in your life that caused you to feel that emotion. Try to be very detailed about 
the way you feel. Following this, you will rate how intensely you feel that emotion now, upon 
describing the event, on a 0 to 10 scale, with 10 being most intense. The next step is to think 
of as many positive sides of that situation as you can, as quickly as you can. After thinking of 
the positive sides, rate how you feel again on the same 0 to 10 scale”.  
As the “neutral” condition involves the up-regulation of emotion from neutral to 
happy, this was explained in more detail: “With sad, scared, and angry, low scores on the 
scale mean less intensely and high scores mean more intense. However, with neutral, the 
more neutral it is, the lower the score, and high scores mean happy. Do you understand the 
difference?” Before we start we have time to practice”. 
Practice. Patients were then trained on the task using an “angry”, and then a “neutral” 
practice condition, with examples of two stories: Having an argument for the “angry” 
condition, and watching television for the “neutral” condition. Following this, participants 
were shown the 0-10 scale, and the description of the scale was repeated again. They were 
then required to think of reappraisals when prompted by the written cue “Think of the 
positive sides. Try to be quick”, before examples of possible reappraisals were provided. For 
the “neutral” condition the example reappraisals were “I was watching television with family, 
which I am lucky to have and spend time with” and “It was nice to have an evening to relax”. 
The example reappraisals for the “angry” condition were: “We don’t argue that often” and 
“Because of this we’ve talked about ways we can communicate better in future”. The 
emotion intensity scale was shown and explained again. If the participant did not understand 
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the task, the practice procedure was repeated, until the participant was satisfied that they 
understood what was required during the task.  
 Testing. Participants were informed that they have a maximum of three minutes to 
describe their stories (as per Salas et al., 2015), but they could use more time if needed. Their 
responses to the reappraising cue (“Think of the positive sides. Try to be quick”) were timed 
and audio-recorded. These recordings are later transcribed verbatim. If participants struggled 
to think of stories, they were prompted with generic stories, for example “Some people would 
say they were sad when they lost a pet or family member”, “Some people would say they 
were angry when they came across someone being rude or disrespectful”, “Some would say 
they were scared when they feared for their or their family’s safety or well-being”, “Some 
would say they were neutral when going for a walk”. Previous work using an ASR task, 
however, shows that brain-injured patients are able to recall emotional events (Salas et al., 
2015, Turnbull et al., 2005). In line with this, all patients were able to recall stories, though 
some required additional prompting during the “neutral” condition, which consisted of asking 
the participant what they did on the days leading up to the testing session.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. ABI participant information and injury characteristics.  
ID Gender Age Years in 
education 
Years since injury   Aetiology  Lesion location & information  
1 M 57 17 1 CVA Left MCA territory. Including left 
inferior frontal gyrus, white matter tracts 
in left frontal lobes. 
2 M 40 13 21 TBI Bilateral frontal contusions. 
3 M 56 13 13 TBI --  
4 M 42 13 1 TBI Left fronto-parietal SAH, left 
intraparenchymal haematoma. Right 
posterior parietal contusion. Right 
temporal haematoma. Bilateral frontal 
extra axial haemorrhage. 
5 M 29 13 1 TBI Bilateral frontal lobe contusion. Right 
temporal lobe contusion. 
6 M 55 16 7 Herpes Simplex 
Encephalitis 
Bilateral asymmetric temporal lobe 
involvement. 
7 F 56 18 1 TBI Bilateral frontal intraparenchymal 
haemorrhage, traumatic SAH, left 
cerebellar haematoma extending to right 
side.   
8 M 57 16 22 TBI Right temporo-parietal lesion. 
9 M 47 10 9 months CVA Multiple infarcts (bilateral). 
10 F 47 16 1 TBI Traumatic SAH. Left frontal & parietal 
contusions. 
11 F 63 11 1 CVA Right MCA occlusion. 
12 M 53 13 4 TBI Left temporo-parietal compound skull 
fracture with underlying contusion. 
13 M 67 13 1 Hypoxic 
Encephalopathy 
-- 
14 M 55 10 10 months CVA Right PCA aneurysm.  
15 M 47 13 29 TBI Left frontal and parietal lesions.  
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16 M 58 13 3 CVA Extensive abnormal areas throughout 
periventricular white matter. 
17 M 58 13 5 TBI Left frontal lobe lesion and possible 
diffuse axonal injury. 
18 M 53 13 9 months CVA Left frontal infarct. 
19 M 54 11 1 TBI Fracture of inferior floor of right orbital 
wall. Presentation highly suggestive of 
frontal lesion. 
20 M 54 16 10 CVA Right MCA territory infarct.  
21 M 50 13 32 TBI -- 
22 M 45 16 1 CVA AcommA Aneurysm. 
23 M 40 11 5 CVA AcommA Aneurysm. 
24 F 26 13 8 TBI Diffuse TBI -- 
25 M 45 10 1 TBI Right frontal lesion, left temporal 
contusion. 
HF26 F 32 11 16 Tumour/CVA Ruptured pituitary gland tumour. No 
other information available.  
HF27 M 70 16 1 CVA Bilateral multiple infarcts, temporal lobe 
involvement. No other information 
available.  
HF28 M 46 13 20 TBI Diffuse TBI, bilateral -- 
HF29 M 43 13 28 TBI Diffuse TBI-- 
HF30 M 59 11 24 TBI -- 
HW31 F 61 11 22 TBI Diffuse TBI-- 
HW32 M 34 16 1 TBI Right sided SAH. -- 
HW33 M 72 10 11 TBI -- 
HW34 F 34 16 10 AVM/CVA Right parieto-occipital lesion. 
HW35 M 74 13 8 CVA Left-sided PCA territory. --  
TBI = traumatic brain injury; CVA = cerebrovascular accident; -- = No information available; AVM = arteriovenous malformation; SAH = 
subarachnoid haemorrhage; MCA =  middle cerebral artery; PCA = posterior cerebral artery; ACommA = Anterior communicating artery. 
Participant IDs beginning with “HF” or “HW” were recruited through Headforward centre and Headway, respectively. 
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Table 2. Emotional and cognitive functioning of ABI patients and HC participants  
 
 Depression  
(HADS) 
Anxiety 
(HADS) 
ERQ-CA Working memory 
(Digit Span, 
WAIS IV) 
Verbal ability 
(Letter fluency, 
DKEFS) 
Inhibition 
(Hayling sentences) 
M,  SD (ABI) 
 
 
9.26,  4.11 9.89,  4.32 22.77,  6.91 22,  5.79 27.57,  11.24 15.03,  3.88 
M,  SD  (HC) 3.32,  2.40 6.23,  3.32 31.32,  6.74 27.18,  3.40 32.32,  7.89 16.15,  2.90 
M,  SD Scaled Score (ABI)    7.51,  2.98 7.03,  3.43 4.66,  1.81 
M,  SD Scaled Score (HC)    10.14,  2.08 8.91,  2.49 5.14,  1.29 
Score range for “borderline 
abnormal/impaired” 
 
 
8 – 10 8 – 10  6 
(scaled) 
4 – 6 
(scaled) 
3 
(scaled) 
Score range for “clinical/impaired” 
 
 
11 – 21 11 – 21  1 – 5 
(scaled) 
1 – 3 
(scaled) 
1 – 2  
(scaled) 
Number participants (/35) in the 
“borderline” range,  “clinical/impaired” 
range 
(ABI) 
 
 
11,  11 2,  20  3,  10 12,  4 3,  4 
Number participants (/22) in the 
“borderline” range, “clinical/impaired” 
range 
(HC) 
 
1,  0 3,  2  0,  1 1,  0 3,  0 
Significant difference 
(t-test p value) 
< .001 .001 < .001 < .001 .041 .254 
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Table 3. Time taken to generate a first reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty)  
 
 Neutral Sadness Fear Anger 
ABI Group 
 M, SD, Mdn 
Mean Rank  
 
 
8.96,  4.38,  8.00 
35.71 
 
9.96,  3.48,  9.50 
34.47 
 
7.79,  3.18,  8.50 
35.84 
 
9.66,  3.90,  8.00 
32.13 
HC Group 
 M, SD, Mdn 
Mean Rank 
  
4.68,  2.98,  3.50 
18.32 
 
6.59,  3.52,  5.25 
20.30 
 
5.52,  2.91,  5.50 
18.11 
 
7.32,  3.60,  8.00 
24.02 
 
Table demonstrating descriptive statistics for reappraisal difficulty across all classes of 
emotion for ABI and HC groups.  
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Table 4. Total number of reappraisals produced (Reappraisal productivity) 
 
 Neutral Sadness Fear Anger 
ABI Group 
 M, SD, Mdn 
Mean Rank  
 
 
3.23,  1.35,  3.00 
24.36 
 
3.31,  2.06,  3.00 
24.63 
 
3.40,  1.96,  3.00 
24.00 
 
3.09,  1.82,  3.00 
24.96 
HC Group 
 M, SD, Mdn 
Mean Rank 
  
4.59,  2.11,  4.00 
36.39 
 
4.73,  2.10,  4.00 
35.95 
 
4.86,  1.86,  5.00 
36.95 
 
3.23,  1.35,  3.00 
35.43 
Table demonstrating descriptive statistics for reappraisal productivity across all classes of 
emotion for ABI and HC groups.  
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Table 5. Reappraisal ability scores (the difference in emotional intensity before, and after, 
reappraising 
 
 
 
Table demonstrating descriptive statistics for reappraisal ability across all classes of emotion 
for ABI and HC groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Neutral Sadness Fear Anger 
ABI Group 
 M, SD, Mdn 
Mean Rank  
 
 
1.08,  1.18,  0.50 
23.37 
 
2.26,  2.01,  1.50 
26.13 
 
2.40,  1.98,  2.50 
26.90 
 
2.11,  2.21,  1.50 
25.64 
HC Group 
 M, SD, Mdn 
Mean Rank 
  
3.21,  2.65,  2.75 
37.95 
 
3.32,  2.51,  2.75 
33.57 
 
3.59,  3.09,  2.50 
32.34 
 
3.46,  2.69,  2.50 
34.34 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Figure demonstrating one trial in the ASRR task (sad condition). 
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Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Bar chart representing the average time taken (seconds) (reappraisal difficulty) to 
generate a first reappraisal across all emotion conditions for both the ABI and HC group.  
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Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Bar chart representing the average number of reappraisals produced (reappraisal 
productivity) across all emotion conditions for both the ABI and HC group.  
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Figure 4.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Bar chart representing the average difference in emotional intensity after 
reappraising (reappraisal ability) across all emotion conditions for both the ABI and HC 
group. 
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